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STUDENT NOTES
CORPORATIONS: CAN A DIRECTOR'S ATTORNEYS' FEES BE
PAID BY CORPORATION FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF SUIT
AGAINST DIRECTOR BY STOCKHOLDER?
Can the directors of a corporation who have been sued individually
for alleged dereliction of duty, resulting in a loss to the corporation,
and who have successfully defended such suit, pay out of the corporation treasury the necessary cost of attorneys' fees in defending such
suit?
The above question has arisen surprisingly few times. Griesse v.
Lange,1 the latest case deciding such issue, held in the negative. In that
case certain stockholders brought an action in a common pleas court
against the directors of a corporation, seeking to recover on behalf of
the corporation losses claimed to have been caused by the directors'
alleged malfeasance, nonfeasance, and misfeasance. The suit resulted
in favor of the directors. The directors caused to be paid from the
treasury of the corporation the sum of $5,000 as attorney's fees. Judgment was given for the defendant and the stockholders sought a writ
of error. The higher court, in reversing, said, "It is elementary that
property or funds of a corporation can only be used or expended for the
advantage of the corporation, or for the purpose stated in its charter
unless assented to by all the stockholders".
G-riesse v. Lange cited two Wisconsin cases, Figge v. BergenthaP
and Jesse et al. v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co. et al.,a apparently basing
its decision on the latter. In Figge v. Bergenthal the plaintiff was a
director of the corporation and the defendants were directors and also
husband and wife. The defendants held the controlling amount of
shares in the corporation. The plaintiff brought an action against the
defendants for fraudulently controlling the affairs of the corporation to
their individual interests. The defendants successfully defended the
suit and paid their attorneys' fees out of the corporate treasury. The
court assented to such payment stating, "Respecting the payment of
attorneys' fees out of corporate funds in the defense of this action little
need be said. Clearly, if no case is made against the defendants it is
not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense
of the action".
It can be seen that a majority of the stockholders assented to the
use of the corporation funds for the payment of the attorneys' fees in
Figge v. Bergenthal in that the defending directors were the majority
'Griesse v. Lange, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. M, 222 (1931).
" Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581 (1906).
"Jesse et al. v. Four-wheel Drive Auto Co. et al., 177 Wis. 627, 189
N. W. 277 (1922).
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stockholders. But the court made no mention of such an assent being
necessary; it merely stated that such payment was just and proper.
In the later Wisconsin case, Jesse v. Auto Co., upon which G-riesse v.
Lange relied for its authority, the World War caused a sudden expansion
of the corporation's business which beforehand had been unprofitable.
Former stockholders began a suit against the directors alleging that
they, having knowledge of the prospective profits of the corporation,
induced the stockholders to part with their stock; that this was accomplished by fraudulent concealment of the business and financial conditions of the corporation. At the annual meeting of the stockholders
the directors were authorized to defend the suit out of corporate funds.
There were nearly 3,000 shares not represented at the meeting. MinorIty stockholders sought to enjoin the use of the corporation's funds in
defending the suit. The court granted the injunction saying,
"From no standpoint, legal, equitable, or moral, can less than
all the shareholders authorize the use of the funds of the corporation for purposes not germane to the business of the corporation.
Much less can it throw its powers and money behind a law-suit in
which it has no interest. And if a corporation cannot do these
things, it most certainly cannot spend the shareholders' interest in
the corporation funds to fight those claiming an interest in such
funds through an action to recover stock illegally secured from
them".
It appears erroneous to say that Jesse v. Auto Co. overruled Figge
v. Bergenthal. Their facts make them clearly distinguishable in that
the appropriation of the funds in Jesse v. Bergental was prior to the
action of the stockholders against the directors. It seems clear that it
is against any sound policy to allow a director to use the corporation's
funds to protect him from being exposed for his actions as a director.
But Figge v. Bergenthaldid not go so far. It allowed only the payment'
of the attorneys' fees after the director had received a judgment freeing him of the alleged misconduct. Therefore the Ohio court in
Griesse v. Lange surely erred in citing Jesse v. Auto Co. as its authority
in reaching its decision.
In Halsbury's Laws of Englanal the author states, "Directors
may not use the funds of the company in payment of their own costs of
legal proceedings, although these would not have been incurred if they
had not been directors, unless incurred on behalf of the company or for
its benefit". But he cites no case where the director was or was not
allowed the payment of attorneys' fees by the corporation when he was
successful in defending a suit for misconduct in his official capacity.
The rule applied in Gcresse v. Lange, that property or funds of a
corporation can be used or expended only for the advantage of the
corporation, or for the purposes stated in the charter unless assented
to by all the stockholders, is a recognized principle of corporation law.'
45 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.) 333.
5Joy v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 11 Mich. 155 (1863).
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Therefore the question arises, would the payment by the corporation
of the attorneys' fees of a director who has successfully defended a suit
by a stockholder for dereliction of duty to the corporation, be of a benefit to the corporation? It has been held that a corporation may pay
extra wages to its workmen or other employees out of its undivided
profits, for the purpose of advancing its interests.0
It has also been
held that the payment of a bonus of one-third the net profits of a corporation to officers and employees was not a fraud upon dissenting stockholders because such bonus would result in a material benefit to the
corporation7 In Corning Glass Works v. Lucas' a donation was made
by the corporation to a hospital in a city two-thirds of the inhabitants
of which were either employees of the corporation, or their dependents.
It was held that the directors of a corporation may not give away
corporate property, but may make donations to enterprises reasonably
calculated to further the general business interest of the corporation.
A director occupies a responsible position and it is essential that he be
whole-heatedly interested in the welfare of the corporation. Such a
relationship is ordinarily possible only if the director is satisfied that
he is being fairly treated by the corporation. Therefore, it seems that
the payment of the attorneys' fees by the corporation when a suit has
been successfully defended by the director would materially benefit the
corporation ultimately by the desire of the director to return the just
treatment he has received in the form of extending himself to give the
best of his abilities to directing the policies of the corporation. It
would also be unduly harsh to require a director to pay out of his own
pocket, the attorneys' fees incurred in successfully defending a suit,
which would have cost him his position as a director had he not
defended it. From another standpoint a director is under a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and when he has protected his position by
defending a suit for removal brought by a stockholder it would seem
that he is merely fulfilling his duty to the corporation by maintaining
the position which was entrusted to his care. Therefore, in performing
such duty the corporation should assume the reasonable expenses incurred thereby.
In an almost analogous situation in the law applicable to executors,
it has been held that if the attempt to remove the executor falls, it is
proper to order payment of attorneys' fees out of the estate.' Ogden v.
Shropshire and Adkins" held that the reason the attorneys' fees of an
executor were paid when he successfully resisted removal was the
61ampson v. Price's Patent Candle Co., 45 Law J. Ch. 437 (1867).
7 Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925).
sCorning Glass Works v. Robert H. Lucas, Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 37 F. (2d) 798 (App. D. C. 1929).
'Smith v. Kennard, 38 Ala. 695 (1863); Tuckerman et al. v. Currier
et al., 54 Colo. 25, 129 Pac. 210 (1912); Armstrong v. Boyd, et al., 140
Ga. 710, 79 S. E. 780 (1913); Ogden v. Shropshire and Adams et al.,
37 S. W. (2d) 249 (Tex. 1931).
"'37 S. W. (2d) 249 (Tex. 1931).
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benefit which accrued to the estate in removing the friction between
the legatees and the executor as a result of the court action. In Armstrong v. BoycP it was decided that when the suit against the executor
was unjustifiable the attorneys' fees of the executor should be paid out
of the estate. The test to determine whether or not the case is justifiable seems to be the result of the issue, that is, it is assumed that the
suit against the executor was unjustifiable because the executor successfully defended the suit.
An executor and a director are both fiduciaries. The funds of a
corporation and of an estate are to be expended only for their appropriate purposes. As shown above, it has been long held that it is just
and proper to order payment of the costs of an unsuccessful suit against
an executor out of the estate. In keeping with such a well settled principle as applied to one type of a fiduciary it seems only just that a director should be saved from paying the attorneys' fees when he successfully defends his position in the corporation.
Under the rule applied in Griesse v. Lange it seems that the term
benefit should justly include the circumstances resulting in favor of the
corporation from the successful defense of a suit by the director. The
different factions of the corporation in all probability tend to cooperate
better as a result of the judicial settlement of the tensions.
Finally, as one of the reasons for protecting the director is that he
has proven himself free from wrong in having successfully defended
such an action, the rule here sought to be applied should only be applicable where the director has been absolved from guilt on the merits
of the case, and should not be extended to protect him when his defense
to such action rests on a bar of remedy only, such as the laches doctrine
in equity. Similarly, it has been held that where an executor is at
fault, although he successfully defeats an attempt to remove him, his
attorneys' fees will not be allowed as costs of administration.2
Due to the question presented by this note being so unsettled, a
director should, if possible, when suit is brought against him contract
with his attorney against personal liability for the fee of counsel, and
that the attorney should look to the corporation for his fee. This was
done by a trustee in a New York caseP when certain beneficiaries of the
trust were seeking his removal. The trust estate was held liable for
the attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending the suit. Mr.
Justice Cardozo reasoned that the defending of the trustee's removal
was beneficial to the trust estate and that the trustee owed a duty to the
estate to stand his ground against unjust attack and because of such
benefit and duty the attorney's fees were payable out of the trust estate
in that such services, if paid for by the trustee personally, would justify
reimbursement to the trustee from the estate. Of course there is not
140 Ga. 710, 79 S. E. 780 (1931).
Smith v. Kennard, 38 Ala. 695 (1863).
SJessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 19 N. E. 403 (1918).
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complete analogy between a director and a trustee in that a director
can resign from his position while a trustee can only be relieved of his
duties by the court's permission.
VNCNT IE=
.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-BASIS FOR DIVORCE-JURISDICTIONAL
FACT CONCEPT.
Prior to the decision in the Haddock' case, the traditional theory
of divorce was that the action was in rem 2 The marital status was
treated as the res,' thus making actual notice to non-residents unnecessary when one of the spouses was domiciled within the domiciliary
forum,4 due process being satisfied by constructive service upon a nonresident when the nature of the action is in rem.'
Atherton v. Athertonl is the well known example of this theory.
In that case the spouses were domiciled in state X. The wife established a separate domicile in state Y. . The spouse domiciled in X
brought suit in X against the absent spouse, giving notice by constructive service, and the court granted a divorce to the domiciled spouse In
X. Subsequently the spouse in Y brought action in Y for a divorce
against the absent spouse. The absent spouse appeared and set up the
decree he obtained in X, and the Supreme Court sustained the argument
that state Y must give the state X decree full faith and credit in
state Y.
This theory is easily applied in proceedings when a tangible asset
is the res because the res remains within one jurisdiction, but when the
res is changed to an intangible object such as the marriage status, then
difficulties multiply rapidly. For example, the absent spouse who has
part of the marital res with him may never hear of the proceedings
against him, and yet if he were to appear in the suit he would easily
disprove the allegations of the complaining spouse. The Atherton case
presents many disadvantages in holding the divorce action to be in
rem7
The Supreme Court, in 1906, decided the Haddock case.8 There
one spouse was domiciled in state X, the other in Y. The spouse domiciled in X, but not the last marital domicile, obtained a divorce from the
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
2Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901) ; See Ballard v. Hunter,
204 U. S. 241 (1907); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 275 S. W. 121
(1925); Harding v. Allen, 9 Greenl 140 (Me. 1832).
3Story, Conflict of Laws (1924), Secs. 229-230; Beale, Haddock
Revisited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 at 418.
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
5Tibbets v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926); Axtell v. Axtell,
181 Ga. 24, 181 S. E. 295 (1935); Hinners v. Banville, 114 N. J. Eq. 348,
168 Atl. 618 (1933).
6181 U. S. 155 (1901).
7 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 100 (1887); Kempson v. Kempson,
63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (1902).
8 201 U. S. 562 (1906).

